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Nonstandard Semantics for Modal Logic and
the Concept of a Logically Possible World
Dale Jacquette ∗
The Pennsylvania State University (USA)
1 Logically Possible Worlds
The idea that a logically possible world is identical with or can be
described as a maximally consistent proposition set is a fundamental as-
sumption of the conventional model set theoretical semantics for modal
logic. Although the concept is formally unproblematic, philosophically
there are serious difficulties in the standard definition of a logically pos-
sible world. I want to raise philosophical objections to the model set
theoretical concept of a logically possible world, and then sketch a pro-
posal for modal semantics that strikes at the root of the problem in order
to avoid these limitations. The conflict to which I call attention has re-
cently been discussed as a dispute between modal realism versus modal
actualism. It will quickly emerge that I am a modal actualist and that I
oppose modal realism.
∗. I am grateful to the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung for supporting this and
related research projects as Forschungsstipendiat during my sabbatical year on leave
from The Pennsylvania State University, 2000-2001, at the Franz Brentano Forschung,
Bayerische-Julius-Maximilians-Universität, Würzburg, Germany.
Philosophia Scientiæ, 9 Cahier 2, 2005, 235–254.
2 What’s Wrong With Standard Modal
Semantics
The definition of a logically possible world as a maximally consistent
proposition set is the heart and soul of conventional model set theoret-
ical semantics for modal logic. It is easy in retrospect to understand
why. The first modal syntax and axiom systems developed by C.I. Lewis
in 1918 were formally uninterpreted until Saul A. Kripke and Jaakko
Hintikka independently worked out model set theoretical semantics for
modal logics and quantified modal logics in the mid-1960s. 1 Building on
the firmly established mathematical foundation of Zermelo-Fraenkel set
theory, Kripke and Hintikka provide an exact formal interpretation of
these logical languages that have proven invaluable in the analysis and
formal modeling of philosophical, scientific, and everyday discourse. 2
The emergence of a powerful mathematical method for interpreting
modal logic made a deep impression on the analytic philosophical imag-
ination in the second half of the twentieth century. It quickly became
a favorite tool for symbolizing many difficult logical concepts. The idea
that a logically possible world is a maximally consistent proposition set
has been so integral to standard model set theoretical semantics that it
has been accepted as part of the same remarkable package, without much
philosophical objection, and, indeed, without much philosophical ques-
tion or scruple. The brilliance and usefulness of these semantic models
and the unified interpretation of the variety of modal logics that they
afford have made model set theoretical semantics a powerful paradigm
of analytic philosophy, comparable in impact, and deservedly so, only to
Russell’s theory of definite descriptions.
The defects of standard model set theoretical semantics are less im-
mediately appreciated; partly, no doubt, because proponents are thor-
oughly convinced of its usefulness and committed to its truth. The
concept of a logically possible world as a maximally consistent propo-
sition set can easily appear philosophically problematic, once we look
beyond the pragmatics of formal analysis. There is no way to sugarcoat
the fact that if sets exist, as mathematical realism classically implies,
1. C.I. Lewis, A Survey of Symbolic Logic (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University
of California Press, 1918).
2. Saul A. Kripke, “Semantical Considerations on Modal Logics”, Acta Philosoph-
ica Fennica, 16, 1963, pp. 83–94. Kripke, “Semantical Analysis of Modal Logic
I: Normal Modal Propositional Calculus”, Zeitschrift für mathematische Logik und
Grundlagen der Mathematik, 9, 1963, pp. 67–96. Jaakko Hintikka, “The Modes of
Modality”, Acta Philosophical Fennica, 16, 1963, pp. 65–81.
then any logically possible world as a maximally consistent proposition
set equally exists, even in the case of a nonactual world consisting en-
tirely of nonexistent objects and nonexistent states of affairs. Moreover,
in the prevailing climate of extensionalism in philosophical semantics, it
is unavoidable to make logically possible worlds into something existent
even when they are nonactual. How can we refer to and truly predi-
cate properties of nonactual merely logically possible worlds, how can
we say anything about them and how can they stand as true predication
subjects, if they do not exist? The idea that nonactual merely logically
possible worlds are maximally consistent proposition sets combined with
a default platonistic or realist ontology of mathematical entities accord-
ing to which proposition sets exist is nevertheless profoundly confused.
Among the indefinitely many logically possible worlds there is intu-
itively only one that actually exists, the one and only actual world in
which we actually existent entities happen to reside. The actual world
alone exists, and it includes all and only the genuine entities, all existent
individuals, states of affairs, and whatever else actually exists as con-
stituting the actual world, while merely logically possible worlds do not
exist. If to insist that the actual world is uniquely existent is unobjec-
tionable, then it is impossible to see how we can tolerate the definition of
a logically possible world according to which all logically possible worlds
exist, including all nonactual merely logically possible worlds. This, re-
grettably, is the inescapable conclusion if logically possible worlds are
defined as maximally consistent proposition sets, and if sets as abstract
mathematical entities exist. If sets exist, then the conventional concept
of a logically possible world as a proposition set requires a counterin-
tuitive distinction between existence and actuality, between what exists
and what is actual, or perhaps between what exists and what actually
exists.
Nor does it help to retreat to a redefinition whereby logically pos-
sible worlds are only described or represented rather than constituted
by maximally consistent proposition sets. The problem in that case is
just the opposite of the one that plagues the interpretation of logically
possible worlds as maximally consistent proposition sets. If all logically
possible worlds are described alike by maximally consistent proposition
sets, then we face the equally difficult question of what it is, as far as the
conventional semantics of modal logic is concerned, that is supposed to
single out the actual world as having special ontic status from all other
nonactual merely logically possible worlds.
To this pertinent ontological query, there is no satisfactory answer in
a conventional modal model set theoretical framework. While modal
logicians have formalized appropriate model set theoretical relations
among logically possible worlds, they have not looked into or tried in
any meaningful way to characterize the metaphysics of being, or to es-
tablish the principles of pure philosophical ontology for actually existent
entities. It is clear, in reading any standard work of formal modal se-
mantics, that the definition of a logically possible world in set theoretical
terms offers no answer at all to the question of what it means for some-
thing to exist, or in particular of what it means for a logically possible
world to be correctly identified as the uniquely existent actual world.
The usual practice is for a model set theoretical semantics to define an
enormous number of combinatorially generated logically possible worlds,
typically by the equivalent of a Lindenbaum maximal consistency recur-
sion, each as a distinct maximally consistent proposition set, and then
simply to declare that one of these sets is to be ‘distinguished’ as the
actual world. Notations differ, but it is common practice to adopt the
mnemonic symbol alpha, ‘α’, or the at-sign, ‘@’, to designate the actual
world in modal semantics as ‘w@’.
3 The philosophical question that ur-
gently remains to be pressed in light of these devices is by virtue of what
features a logically possible world, if universally defined as a maximally
consistent proposition set, is correctly identified as the actual world?
It is possible for many things in the actual world to be other than they
are. Life need not have evolved, the Third Reich might have won World
War II, or I might have gone to Mexico to snorkel instead of Austria
to ski. The actual world is only one possibility among limitlessly many
others. Of all the logically possible worlds, only one is actual. We might
not yet know exactly what this means, or why it should be so, if we
have not yet grasped what makes the actual world actual, and what
distinguishes it from all nonactual merely logically possible worlds. To
that extent, also, we do not yet fully and accurately understand what is
3. Among other sources, see David K. Lewis, Counterfactuals (Oxford: Blackwell
Publishing, 1973). Some developments of model set theoretical semantics for modal
logic do not refer to the actual world as such, but make only passing reference to the
fact that the actual world is to be included as one among all logically possible worlds,
and considering only generalized accessibility relations relative to any arbitrary world
α. A good example of this approach to set theoretical modal semantics is Brian F.
Chellas, in his Modal Logic: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1980), who does not define the concept of a logically possible world but treats
it as primitive or intuitive. A generalized semantics of the sort Chellas considers must
be supplemented with a method of designating the actual world for applications such
as the interpretation of counterfactual propositions, in which the facts of the actual
world are contrasted with propositions that are supposed to be true in alternative
logically possible worlds via some specification of world-to-world modal accessibility
relations.
meant by the concept of a logically possible world. This is precisely what
is missing from the definition of a logically possible world in conventional
model set theoretical modal semantics. We transgress the limits of pure
logic if we try to say that the actual world is the one that we logicians
psychologically experience, or that has the objects or states of affairs that
we encounter in sensation. It nevertheless appears that efforts to single
out the actual world in conventional modal semantics never amounts to
anything more than this kind of implicit appeal to extralogical empirical
facts.
3 General Existence Conditions for Entities
Where, then, can we start, if in the semantics for modal logic we must
start again? We can say that the actual world is the world consisting
of all and only existent states of affairs involving all and only existent
objects, and conversely that an existent object or state of affairs is an
object or state of affairs that belongs to the actual world, as opposed to
a merely logically possible world.
We do not necessarily know from this alone what either of these
statements is supposed to mean in the absence of a unified account of
the existence of entities, including actually existent logically possible
objects, states of affairs, and the actual world. It is only if we come into
possession of a correct metaphysics of being that we can hope to explain
what it means for a logically possible world to be actual, and why there
exists exactly one actual world. We need, in other words, to answer
satisfactorily the question why or with what justification a particular
logically possible world is rightly designated as the actual world, and
distinguished thereby from all nonactual merely logically possible worlds.
The next important step in analyzing the concept of being required
by a philosophically astute modal semantics is to clarify the concept of an
actual world. Kripke, in his lectures on Naming and Necessity, reminds
us that logically possible worlds are not viewed through high-powered
telescopes to discover what objects they contain. 4 We similarly need to
4. “A possible world isn’t a distant country that we are coming across, or viewing
through a telescope. Generally speaking, another possible world is too far away. Even
if we travel faster than light, we won’t get to it. A possible world is given by the
descriptive conditions we associate with it. . . ‘Possible worlds’ are stipulated, not
discovered by powerful telescopes. There is no reason why we cannot stipulate that,
in talking about what would have happened to Nixon in a certain counterfactual
situation, we are talking about what would have happened to him.” [Kripke 1980,
44]
understand that the actual world is not selected from a beauty pageant
lineup of all logically possible world hopefuls, only one of which is to be
’designated’ as actual. We need to disabuse ourselves of misleading ways
of imagining the semantics of modal logic, and the existence requirements
for logically possible objects, states of affairs, and the actual world. The
actual world does nothing to deserve its actuality in competition with
nonactual merely logically possible worlds. It is the actual world as a
matter of fact because it satisfies the requirements of being, whatever
these turn out to be.
Without further ado, I now want to propose what I consider to be the
correct analysis of the concept of being. The definition is intensional,
involving an object’s properties, in what I shall refer to as a property
combination. A property combination is the set of properties nominalis-
tically associated with an object, corresponding to the Fregean sense of
an object’s logically proper name or definite description. Accordingly,
I shall say that to be is to have a maximally consistent property com-
bination. An entity is an existent object, state of affairs, or the actual
world as a whole, which by the present proposal is one that has a max-
imally consistent property combination. A nonexistent intended object,
including fictional objects that belong to the semantic domain of a logic
of fiction, is an object whose property combination is either inconsistent,
containing both a property and its complement, or incomplete, failing to
contain either a property or its complement. A logically possible world is
a logically consistent states of affairs combination; a nonfactual, merely
logically possible world is a submaximally possible states of affairs com-
bination, and the actual world is a maximally consistent possible states
of affairs combination. I shall refer to a theory of this kind as a combi-
natorial analysis of the concept of being.
If an object has both or is lacking both a property and property-
complement pair from its property combination, then the object fails to
exist. An entity cannot be both red and non-red or fail to be either
red or non-red, round and/or non-round, and so on. In the first case,
its property combination would be inconsistent, and in the second case
incomplete or submaximal. Maximal consistency is evidently necessary
for existence; whether it is also sufficient is a question that forces us
to reconsider the definition of a logically possible world as a maximally
consistent proposition set.
A defender of conventional modal semantics is committed to deny-
ing that maximal consistency is sufficient for an object to be actual or
actually existent. Modal logicians, recognizing the difficulty, and des-
perate to find a way to resolve conflicting intuitions, typically relativize
existence to particular logically possible worlds. They say, for example
that the Statue of Liberty exists in the actual world, but that in other
logically possible worlds there exist objects like the Fountain of Youth or
city of Eldorado that do not exist in ‘our’ world. 5 Conventional modal
semantics thus entails that there are objects and states of affairs that
truly exist in worlds that truly do not exist. Such a position appears
logically incoherent, in opposition to the pre-analytic intuition that all
and only the entities and states of affairs belonging to the actual world
exist.
Why, then, does conventional modal semantics insist that all logically
possible worlds are maximally consistent proposition sets? Perhaps it is
because these logicians perceive that the actual world is maximally con-
sistent, and that it is, after all, a logically possible world. The more
important question that is not usually asked is rather, what if it is maxi-
mal consistency that makes the actual world actual, a property shared by
no merely logically possible nonactual world? It may be less objection-
able in trying to work out the formal semantic structures for interpreting
the propositions of modal logic not to become embroiled in the meta-
physics of being for the actual world or the states of affairs by which it
is constituted or the entities it contains. In metaphysics, on the other
hand, in ontology’s inquiry into the concept of being, we cannot afford to
ignore such problems. It appears that conventional model set theoretical
modal semantics, neglecting the difficulty of what it means for the ac-
tual world to be so designated and distinguished from among all merely
logically possible worlds, fails to recognize drastically counterintuitive
results even within its limited project of formalizing modal semantics.
Conventional modal logic, with a mathematician’s typical insouciance
about the philosophical problems of ontology, does not seem to care at
all about the question of being — but it should.
By defining existence as the maximal consistency of an object’s prop-
erty combination, we explain what it means for the actual world to exist,
and we recover consistency in maintaining that only objects and states
of affairs in the actual world exist, and that only the actual world exists.
We can then say that for the actual world to exist, to be designated or
distinguished as actual from among all other logically possible worlds,
means for it to be a maximally consistent states of affairs combination.
5. An example of this widespread practice is found in [Forbes 1985, 28]: “The
discussion of the previous section should have imparted a general picture of what
model theory for quantified S5 is going to look like. As in the sentential case, there
will be a set of possible worlds, but in addition, each world will be assigned a set of
objects, the things which exist at that world”.
This in turn is equivalent to the actual world’s consisting only of objects
and states of affairs whose property combinations are maximally con-
sistent, and to the states of affairs combination of the actual world in
its entirety as an existent entity being maximally consistent. These are
all purely logical concepts, by which the actual world is distinguished as
a maximally consistent states of affairs combination to be represented
linguistically as a uniquely maximally consistent proposition set, unlike,
by the proposed definition of existence, all nonactual merely logically
possible worlds. 6
Ametaphysics of being as maximal consistency for all entities, includ-
ing objects, states of affairs, and the actual world, is unified, economical,
and comprehensive. Is it also true? The sticking point, for most con-
temporary modal logicians, is undoubtedly the implication that nonac-
tual merely logically possible worlds are submaximally consistent states
of affairs combinations: possible, because they are at least internally
consistent in their constitutive states of affairs by which properties are
attributed to objects; submaximal, in that they are incomplete in the
sense of containing property and property complement gaps, projected
into their constitutive gappy incomplete states of affairs combinations.
Standard modal semantics regards all logically possible worlds as de-
scriptively maximally consistent proposition sets. 7
6. I explore these topics in greater depth and historical context in Dale Jacquette,
Ontology (Acumen Publishing, 2003). See especially Part I on Pure Philosophical
Ontology, including Chapters 2–5, on ‘Combinatorial Ontology’, ‘Why There is Some-
thing Rather Than Nothing’, ‘Why There is Only One Logically Contingent Actual
World’, and ‘Concepts of Existence in Philosophical Logic and the Analysis of Being
qua Being’. The key to understanding why there can be at most one maximally
consistent states of affairs combination is that if we think of the actual world as max-
imally consistent, and imagine the occurrence of something else, a putatively distinct
but equally actual world, even if it were to consist only of a single maximally con-
sistent object or state of affairs, it would fall under the combinatorial analysis of the
concept of an actual world and hence would necessarily de facto be only a distinct
part of the one and only actual world or literal universe. The two hypothetical actu-
alities would logically definitionally be absorbed into one; metaphorically speaking,
like two drops of mercury touching.
7. The commitment to the idea of a logically possible world as maximal is clearly
stated in Forbes, The Metaphysics of Modality, p. 8: “A possible world is a complete
way things might have been — a total alternative history . . . In terms of our model
theory, the requirement that worlds be complete is reflected in the constraint that
every sentence letter occurring in the argument in question be assigned one or other
truth value at each world.” This intuitive statement of the semantic concept of a
logically possible world is equivalent to the conventional definition of a world as a
maximally consistent proposition set. Forbes significantly adds, ibid.: “We shall see
in §4 of this chapter that we can get by without this sort of completeness, but that
we pay a price in terms of simplicity.”
4 Maximal Consistency of the Actual World
We now set the stage for three arguments in support of the con-
clusion, contrary to conventional model set theoretical modal semantics,
that nonactual merely logically possible worlds should not be interpreted
semantically as maximally consistent, but as at most only submaximally
consistent states of affairs combinations. Against the assumptions of
conventional modal semantics, it seems correct on the contrary to hold
that only the actual world is maximally consistent.
The upshot of a combinatorial analysis of the concept of being is that
all nonactual merely logically possible worlds are submaximal. Further-
more, and most importantly, the combinatorial theory proposed here
does not equate logically possible worlds with maximally or submaxi-
mally consistent proposition sets, but with maximally or submaximally
consistent states of affairs combinations. The present proposal is thereby
distinguished from efforts to relate logically possible worlds to proposi-
tional set theoretical quasi-filters. If we wish, in response to related
semantic needs, as several writers have proposed, we can further speak
of impossible worlds as involving inconsistent submaximal or even maxi-
mal states of affairs combinations. 8 The reward for defining existence as
maximal consistency is that we thereby provide a clearcut logical foun-
dation for distinguishing the actual world as uniquely existent, without
making every logically possible world an existent proposition set.
The difficulty to be answered in defending the theory is that it seems
we can also freely describe maximally consistent proposition sets in the
same way that we can describe other mathematical entities. Nothing
prevents a conventional modal logician from devising Lindenbaum-style
recursions whereby all the distinct complete and consistent sets of propo-
sitions are projected. The method is to consider each proposition in turn
and add it to a given set if and only if it is logically consistent with the
propositions already collected in the set until there are none left, and
otherwise adding its negation, following the process in the case of every
logically distinct combination of propositions until every proposition or
8. Graham Priest, guest-edited issue of Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 38,
1997, on ‘Impossible Worlds’, including contributions by Edwin D. Mares, “Who’s
Afraid of Impossible Worlds?”, pp. 516–526; Daniel Nolan, “Impossible Worlds: A
Modest Approach”, pp. 535–572; and David A. Van der Laan, “The Ontology of Im-
possible Worlds”, pp. 597–620. See Jaakko Hintikka, “Impossible Possible Worlds”,
Journal of Philosophical Logic, 4, 1975, pp. 475–484. Nicholas Rescher and Robert
Brandom, The Logic of Inconsistency: A Study in Non-Standard Possible-World Se-
mantics and Ontology (Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1979), distinguish between
‘inconsistent’ and ‘impossible’ worlds.
its negation is incorporated. A similar recursion is followed in consis-
tency and completeness proofs in standard logical metatheory, which no
doubt played an important role historically, along with the default realist
or platonistic ontology for mathematical entities, in the received concept
of a logically possible world as a maximally consistent proposition set. If
we are platonic realists in the applied scientific ontology of mathematics,
then we may be strongly inclined if not irrevocably committed to regard-
ing such sets as themselves existent mathematical entities to which we
can appeal ad libitum in theory construction, especially in designing a
model set theoretical semantics for modal logic.
The combinatorial analysis of the concept of being as maximal con-
sistency does not cast doubt on the possibility of such a procedure. On
the contrary, we assume that maximally consistent proposition sets, re-
gardless of how they are classified in applied ontology, can be thought
of as being compiled combinatorially in just this way. The issue is
rather whether the resulting maximally consistent sets of propositions
deserve to be called or considered as describing nonactual logically pos-
sible worlds. As indicated, the identification or description of a logically
possible world as a maximally consistent proposition set, or logically
derivative from a maximally consistent states of affairs combination, is
warranted only in the unique case of the actual world. Nonactual merely
logically possible worlds, by comparison, are fictional creatures of con-
ventional modal semantics, and as such inherently predicationally in-
complete, involving inherently incomplete states of affairs combinations.
The following arguments provide good reasons for adopting the un-
conventional concept of a logically possible world that has now been
introduced in a reformed semantics of modal logic. To dramatize the
limitations of conventional modal semantics, we argue that submaxi-
mal consistency affects even the proposition sets standardly associated
with logically possible worlds, thus opening the door to logically pos-
sible worlds as maximally or submaximally consistent states of affairs
combinations.
Objection 1: Kripkean Transworld Identity Stipulations are Inherently
Submaximal
The first objection to considering maximally consistent proposition
sets as nonactual merely logically possible worlds depends on Kripke’s
answer to the transworld identity problem. Objects and states of affairs
in the actual world might have been so different than they actually are
that it appears impossible even in theory and certainly in practice to
identify the same objects from world to world by positive correspondence
with their descriptions in any given world.
Kripke sidesteps the problem by arguing that transworld identity is
not a matter of discovery, but of decision. We stipulate, in Kripke’s
terminology, that there is a nonactual logically possible world in which
Richard Nixon’s chromosomal endowment is so radically altered prior
even to his development in the womb that at no time within that world
is he recognizable as the Richard Nixon we know from experience of his
appearance in the actual world, but exactly resembles Marily Monroe. 9
Kripke’s response to transworld identity problems has gained wide accep-
tance among modal logicians. Taken literally, although Kripke does not
acknowledge the consequence, Kripkean transworld identity stipulation
implies a constitutional incompleteness in the proposition sets associ-
ated with any nonactual logically possible world, by which they can only
be submaximal even if logically consistent. Stipulation involves real-
time human decision-making that is incompatible with the possibility of
including all the items in a consistent proposition set needed in order
to qualify as maximally consistent. We, finite creatures that we are,
can only submaximally stipulate so much in describing distinct logically
possible worlds in the limited time we can devote to such theorizing, in
which this or that is different from the actual world, and leave the rest
unspecified.
Objection 2: Submaximal Consistency is Adequate for the Modal Se-
mantics of Nonactual Worlds
Secondly, it is significant that submaximally consistent proposition
sets are adequate for the formal semantics of modal logic in the case of all
nonactual logically possible worlds. It is good enough for the purposes
of formalizing a general semantics of modal logic to recognize maximal
consistency only in the case of the actual world. There is nothing we can
practically do with maximally consistent proposition sets in understand-
ing the truth conditions for sentences in modal logic that we cannot do
with submaximally consistent sets or submaximally consistent states of
affairs combinations.
As a further theoretical advantage, submaximally consistent propo-
sition sets do not incur the difficulties of conventional modal seman-
tics. They encourage an answer to the question of being with respect to
worlds, explaining the actual world as maximally consistent in its fully
consistent complement of actually existent states of affairs as determined
9. See Hugues Leblanc, “On Dispensing With Things and Worlds”, in Logic and
Ontology: Studies in Contemporary Philosophy, edited by Milton K. Munitz (New
York: New York University Press, 1973); reprinted in Leblanc, Existence, Truth,
and Provability (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982), pp. 103–119.
Forbes, The Metaphysics of Modality, especially pp. 70–89.
by the actually instantiated properties of actually existent entities. They
further avoid the need to relativize existence to specific logically possi-
ble worlds, dispensing with the confusing assertion that the Fountain of
Youth exists in a particular world, whatever this is supposed to mean,
when we assume on the contrary without qualification that the Fountain
of Youth does not exist or does not actually exist. The very idea of
‘existence in a (nonactual) world’ ought to be avoided if at all possible,
because it saddles modal logic with a problematic way of distinguishing
the actual world from alternative logically possible worlds. The actual
world in that case cannot be identified as the world containing all and
only existent states of affairs involving all and only existent entities. All
worlds, paradoxically, then, each have their own world-indexed existent
entities. We are further obliged in that case to index actually exis-
tent entities to the predesignated actual world, whose facts and objects
are existent-w@, rather than existent−w1, −w2, −w3, and so on, where
@ = 1, 2, 3, . . .
What, then, could possibly justify conventional modal logic’s demand
that nonactual merely logically possible worlds are maximally consistent
rather than submaximally consistent proposition sets or states of affairs
combinations? Why go maximal except in the unique case of the actual
world? The only imaginable reason has to do with an intuition about the
meaning of the word ‘world’, according to which submaximal consistency
does not deserve to be called or associated with a world, or that a world
in the true sense of the word, even if it is nonactual and merely logically
possible, must be maximal. The reasoning, however, seems unfounded
and there are overriding counterobjections in favor of the interpretation
of nonactual merely logically possible worlds as submaximally consistent
states of affairs combinations.
Objection 3: Nonactual Worlds by Definition are Submaximally Con-
sistent
A third justification for distinguishing the actual world as the only
maximally consistent proposition set or states of affairs combination,
by contrast with the submaximal consistency of nonactual merely logi-
cally possible worlds, is based on a trilemma. The argument reveals a
deeper reason why nonactual merely logically possible worlds are sub-
maximally consistent. A maximally consistent set of propositions, even
on the weakest accessibility relations between logically possible worlds in
model set theoretical semantics, must include true or false propositions
about the actual states of affairs obtaining in the actual world. Nonac-
tual worlds must look over their shoulders at what is happening in the
actual world, so to speak, and make some statement about the situation
there, in order to be maximal. Otherwise, there will be propositions
that are entirely left out of their proposition sets, which by definition
are thereby submaximal.
The proposition set of a nonactual merely logically possible world as
a result has a conflicting set of responsibilities if it is to be maximally
consistent. It must pretend, in certain cases, that the Fountain of Youth
‘actually’ exists, or exists in its associated world, and must accordingly
include a proposition to this effect, while at the same time declaring
that the Fountain of Youth does not exist, or does not actually exist or
exist in the actual world. We have already seen that indexing the truth
of propositions to particular logically possible worlds within proposition
sets associated with worlds is a philosophically questionable practice in
modal semantics. Now we are prepared to see worse problems arise
whether or not world-indexing of propositions is tolerated. Consider a
proposition set S for a nonactual merely logically possible world wi, that
is striving for maximal consistency in the spirit of conventional model set
theoretical modal semantics. Set S either includes or does not include
the proposition that the Fountain Youth does not exist, and either does
so indexically by making reference to the truth of the proposition in the
actual world, or nonindexically.
Thus, there are three possibilities:
(1) If S does not include any proposition expressing the fact that the
Fountain of Youth does not exist (in actual world w@), then S is
submaximal, even if it is logically consistent.
(2) If S includes a proposition expressing the fact that the Fountain
of Youth does not exist indexically by referring to the proposition’s
truth in or with reference to the actual world w@, ‘The Fountain
of Youth does not exist (in w@)’, then it must also assert the ex-
istence of the Fountain of Youth in or with reference to wi, ‘The
Fountain of Youth exists in wi’ (i = @). Then, problems of in-
dexicality for an extensionalist model set theoretical logic aside
(and they are considerable, including the danger of outright log-
ical paradox), S contains propositions that acknowledge by their
explicit indexing that the Fountain of Youth does not actually ex-
ist; in effect declaring its own falsehood, a false description of the
world, thereby rendering S unfit as a description of wi.
(3) If S includes a proposition nonindexically expressing the fact that
the Fountain of Youth does not exist (in w@) and nonindexically
expressing the fact that the Fountain of Youth does exist (in wi, i =
@, as before), then, without benefit of the indices indicated in
parentheses, S is inconsistent, even if maximal.
We want to know what it means for the actual world to be distin-
guished as actual, by comparison with all nonactual merely logically
possible worlds. We also want to be able to say that only the actual
world exists, that all and only the objects and states of affairs in the
actual world exist, that existence is not to be relativized to worlds, but
that ‘existence’ means real existence or actuality. Thus, it seems we have
no choice but to rethink the conventional wisdom of standard model set
theoretical modal semantics. Set S is logically inconsistent if it recog-
nizes the facts of the actual world but shuns indexicality, submaximal if
it ignores the facts of the actual world, and inadequate as a description
of wi if it embraces indexicality in order consistently to include the facts
of the actual world, such as the fact that the Fountain of Youth does not
actually exist.
It may finally appear as somewhat of a relief to consider that, even
if nonactual merely logically possible worlds are defined combinatorially
rather than set theoretically, all the standard set theoretical machinery
of conventional model set theoretical modal semantics on which we have
come to rely can remain in place, leaving the formal semantics of modal
logic untouched. We can preserve set theoretical relations among sets
of worlds just as before, even if worlds are not themselves sets, and
in particular even if they are not maximally consistent proposition sets,
but maximally or submaximally consistent states of affairs combinations.
A logically necessary proposition, if there are any, is still one that is
true in every logically possible world, involving the stipulation-exempt
properties of abstract entities exclusively; a logically possible proposition
is still one that is true in at least one logically possible world; and we can
still invoke differential accessibility relations between logically possible
worlds to interpret iterated and especially quantified iterated alethic
modalities.
5 Alethic Modality and the Logic of Fiction
We are now in a position to appreciate the significance of the logic
of fiction in a combinatorial semantics of alethic modal logic. The con-
ventional approach is to develop a model set theoretical semantics for
modal logic and then to apply modal logic in trying to understand the
logic of fiction. If the objections raised here are sound, then this other-
wise reasonable strategy has things reversed. Logically possible worlds
other than the actual world in that case are mere semantic fictions, so
that we stand in need first of an adequate logic of fiction in order to
formalize an exact interpretation of alethic modality.
All nonactual merely logically possible worlds are not rightly iden-
tified with sets, let alone maximally consistent proposition sets, but
with appropriately submaximally consistent states of affairs combina-
tions that are not associated with any existent entity. The worlds to
which they correspond are fictional, not only in the loose sense of char-
acterizing nonexistent incomplete objects, but in the more accurately
delimited sense of being described in a work of discourse. The fictions
in which nonactual merely logically possible worlds are presented might
be stories, novels, poetry, and other forms of entertainment literature, in
scientific writings, including theories of natural phenomena that happen
to be false, and in Kripke-style stipulative but intensionally combinato-
rially interpreted modal semantic constructions. This is as it should be
if we assume that the actual world is uniquely existent and that nonac-
tual merely logical possible worlds do not exist even and especially as
abstract mathematical or propositional structures. When we produce
a formal semantics for alethic modal logic, on the present account, we
refer to the uniquely existent maximally consistent actual world, and we
also engage in fiction, creating an imaginary order of nonactual merely
logically possible submaximally consistent worlds that are different in
their nonexistent constituent facts and usually also in their nonexistent
constituent objects from the actual world. 10
10. Recent sources on the modal realism-actualism controversy include Charles Chi-
hara, The Worlds of Possibility: Modal Realism and the Semantics of Modal Logic
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1998). Robert Stalnaker, ‘On Considering a Possible
World as Actual I’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplement, 75, 2001.
Merrie Bergmann, ‘A New Argument from Actualism to Serious Actualism’, Noûs,
30, 1996. Phillip Bricker, ‘Isolation and Unification: The Realist Analysis of Possible
Worlds, Philosophical Studies, 84, 1996. Selmer Bringsjord, ‘Are There Set Theoretic
Possible Worlds?’, Analysis, 45, 1985. John Divers, ‘Modal Fictionalism Cannot De-
liver Possible Worlds Semantics’, Analysis, 55, 1995. Patrick Grim, ‘On Sets and
Worlds: A Reply to Menzel’, Analysis, 46, 1986. Bob Hale, ‘Modal Fictionalism -
A Simple Dilemma’, Analysis, 55, 1995. Allen Hazen, ‘Expressive Incompleteness in
Modal Logic’, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 5, 1976; ‘a logically consistent states
of affairs’, Philosophical Studies, 84, 1996. T. Jager, ‘An Actualist Semantics for
Quantified Modal Logic’, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 23, 1982. Michael
Jubien, ‘Actualism and Iterated Modalities’, Philosophical Studies, 84, 1996. Jaeg-
won Kim, ‘Possible Worlds and Armstrong’s Combinatorialism’, Canadian Journal of
Philosophy, 16, 1986. Alan McMichael, ‘A New Actualist Modal Semantics’, Journal
of Philosophical Logic, 12, 1983; ‘A Problem for Actualism About Possible Worlds’,
The Philosophical Review, 92, 1983. Christopher Menzel, ‘On Set Theoretic Possi-
ble Worlds’, Analysis, 46, 1986; ‘Actualism, Ontological Commitment, and Possible
Worlds Semantics’, Synthese, 85, 1990. Alvin Plantinga, ‘Actualism and Possible
Worlds’, in The Possible and the Actual, edited by Michael J. Loux, Ithaca: Cor-
nell University Press, 1979. Greg Ray, ‘Ontology-Free Modal Semantics’, Journal of
It might be wondered why we could not similarly dissociate maxi-
mally consistent proposition sets from logically possible worlds in conven-
tional model set theoretical semantics. What final advantage is gained
by invoking property or states of affairs combinations in place of sets in
combinatorial modal semantics? The trouble is that if we try to separate
worlds from maximally consistent proposition sets, then, conventionally,
what is a logically possible world if it is not an existent set? If worlds are
only remotely associated or correlated with proposition sets, then they
cannot be referred to or have constitutive properties truly predicated
of them in a conventional extensionalist semantic framework. When we
hear a philosopher say, ‘It is logically possible that pigs fly means that
there is at least one logically possible world inhabited by airborne swine’,
we are to understand this as equivalent to a logician’s tale, beginning
with the preamble, ‘Once upon a time . . . ’
Nor is completeness a feature of logically possible worlds that we can
freely stipulate. If completeness itself could be stipulated, if we could
simply declare and it would then be true that there is a maximally consis-
tent state of affairs combination in which pigs fly, then when A stipulates
a complete world in which pigs fly and B stipulates a complete world
in which pigs fly, then, other things being equal, A and B presumably
stipulatively identify the same world. If that in turn were true, however,
then there should be no further questions, as there obviously are, about
whether in the supposedly complete world A stipulates as in the suppos-
edly complete world B stipulates donkeys as well as pigs fly, since either
possibility could hold true in a complete world in which pigs fly. So,
which is it? When A and B stipulate a complete, maximally consistent
world in which pigs fly, are they stipulating a world in which donkeys fly
or one in which donkeys do not fly? The stipulated worlds are clearly
indeterminate in this respect; they are and should be understood, in the
absence of further specification, as the same constitutionally incomplete
stipulated nonactual merely logically possible worlds. Otherwise, we are
committed to the possibility of distinct but logically indistinguishable
worlds. This is precisely why an intensionalist property-oriented com-
binatorial semantics is offered as an alternative to traditional model set
theoretical semantics for modal logic. It is also why we are forced to
adopt a logic of fiction in order to do justice to the nonactual merely
logically possible worlds by which logical possibilities relative to the ac-
tual facts or actually existent states of affairs of the uniquely existent
Philosophical Logic, 25, 1996. Peter Van Inwagen, ‘Two Concepts of Possible Worlds’,
Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 11, 1986. Stephen Yablo, ‘How in the World?’, Philo-
sophical Topics, 24, 1996.
actual world are interpreted. 11
We need an intensional logic of fiction rather than an extensional
mathematical theory of sets for the semantics of modal logic. The rea-
son is that nonactual merely logically possible worlds are the imagina-
tive creatures of formal theoretical semantic fictions. Logically possible
worlds other than the actual world are not real things, but modal the-
oretical fictions. What Kripke and others do not seem to have fully
appreciated, in the grip of the model set theoretical apparatus for in-
terpreting modal logic, is that to stipulate a logically possible world is
11. Chihara in The Worlds of Possibility argues that a Cantorian cardinality para-
dox aﬄicts Plantinga’s set theoretical principles of modal semantics in The Nature of
Necessity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974). Chihara identifies the following
assumptions in Plantinga’s modal ontology, p. 125:
‘1. States of affairs exist.
2. Every state of affairs S has a complement S′.
3. If S is a state of affairs, then necessarily either S or S′ obtains.
4. Given any possible state of affairs S, there exists a set whose members are all
those possible states of affairs whose members are all those possible states of
affairs that include S.
5. Given any set b of states of affairs, the conjunction of that set, all the members
of b having obtained, exists.’
Chihara infers the existence of at least one logically possible world by building up a
set b by means of a Lindenbaum-style maximal consistency recursion, adding either S
or the complement of S, S′, for every S, and defining D as the state of affairs of all the
states of affairs in b having obtained. Set D thereby satisfies the conventional model
set theoretical definition of a logically possible world, which Plantinga also accepts,
the existence of which, by Plantinga’s principles, is set-theoretically guaranteed. Chi-
hara then deduces a Cantorian paradox, p. 126: ‘As shown above, we can conclude
from Plantinga’s prinicples that there is a set a whose elements are all the possible
states of affairs that obtain. Then, according to Cantor’s Theorem, the power set
of a, 2a, has cardinality greater than the cardinality of a. Hence, there cannot be a
one-one correspondence between 2a and any subset of a. But, as will be shown below,
there is.’ The proposed combinatorial analysis of alethic modality avoids Chihara’s
Cantorian paradox by detaching the concept of a logically possible world from that
of a maximally consistent proposition or states of affairs set like D. Chihara’s para-
dox refutes conventional model set theoretical concepts of a logically possible world,
like Plantinga’s. Importantly, the combinatorial model does not accept Plantinga’s
principle [2], that all states of affairs exist, since not all states of affairs combinations
are maximally consistent. Nor does Chihara’s proof of the existence of at least one
logically possible world on Plantinga’s realist assumptions go through in a combina-
torial actualist modal ontology and semantics. At most, Chihara establishes a result
that is limited in immediate relevance to set theory in the abstract, including con-
ventional set theoretical models of logical possibility. In proving the existence of set
D, Chihara establishes the existence of at least one maximally consistent states of
affairs set. From a combinatorial modal actualist perspective, however, he does not
thereby prove the existence of a logically possible world. The only logically possible
world recognized as existent in an actualist combinatorial modal semantics is the ac-
tual world, and it is not an abstract set but a maximally consistent states of affairs
combination.
to fictionalize, to tell a partial, inevitably incomplete story about places
and times that do not in any sense exist.
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